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JAMES ALLEN SCOTT, by and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, Erma Lee Scott,
- vs -
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
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Defendant,

BOYD SIMMONS,
- vs -
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant,

ANGELO MELO, WAULSTINE McNEELY and
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL,
- VS -

Plaintiffs,

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant,

BRIEF OF
NA'l1URE OF 'l1HE CASE
Plaintiffs claim an amount of money from Defendant, Utah State Department of Fjnanre, Administrator
of the State Insurance Fund, which represents Defendants share of costs and attorneys fees in Third Party
lawsuits brought under the provisions of Sec. 35-1-62
Ptah CodP Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1966).
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs received judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of Lower Courts judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The claims of all of the plaintiffs have the following
factors in common :
Plruntiffs received on-the-job injuries.
Plaintiffs requested and received compensation payments from defendant, Utah State Insurance Fund.
Plaintiffs pressed claims against "third parties" as
provided in Sec. 35-1-62 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol.
1966).
Plaintiffs received compensation of the third party
claims.
Plaintiffs reimbursed the defendant for the compensation it had paid.
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Defendant did not pay any portion of the attorneys'
fees or court costs incurred by plaintiffs in their "third
party'' claims.
At the time the defendant \Vas reimbursed, plaintiffs' attorneys protested the payment indicating that
defendant should be required to pay a portion of the
attorneys' fees and court costs.
All of the above events took place prior to the Utah
Supreme Court decision in the case of TV.orthen vs. Shurtleff and AndrPws, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223.
1

At the time the above events took place, the Utah
Supreme Court case of McConnell vs. Commission of
Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395 375 P. 2d 394. enunciated the
controlling law on the issued in these cases, i.e., the
compensation carrier was not required to pay a portion
of the attorneys' fees and court costs of "third party
:wtions."
The present suits were c01mnenced subsequent to the
decision in TVorthen vs. Shurtleff and Andrews. Inc., 19
l T tah 2d so, 426 p, 2d 223.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, INC., 19 Utah 2d 80,
426 P. 2d 223, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

4

Defendant contends that the doctrine laid down in
the Worthen case should not be applied retroactively
so as to require defendant to pay costs and attorneys'
fees on cases that were settled before the Worthen case.
The question of whether the law of a case applies
retroactively or only prospectively is said to be an old
and difficult one. See 20 Arn. Jur. 2d. 562, Courts Section 233. To be sure, the overwhelming majority of
c·ases dealing with the question are very old with the
<'xception of a fe-w cases dealing with the application of
cases construing constitutional rights. A few generalities may be stated 'With respect to the question. First,
retroactive generally dot's not raise a constitutional issue.
Linklettrr 1.·s. T¥alker, 381 U.S. 618; Tehan vs. U.S. e.r
, cl Shott. 382 F.S. 406; Ruark vs. People, 158 Colo. 110,
-W5 P. 2d 751. An exception to this rule is if retroactive
t.•ffect would impair the obligations of existing contracts
or dPstroy vPsted rights. Taylor '0S. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S.
GO ( 15 Otto) ( 1881). Jackson vs. Harris, 43 F. 2d 513;
Continental Supply Co. vs. Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P. 2d
133; O'Malln; rs. Simms, 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P. 2d 50. The
<leeision of 'dwther or not to apply a decision retroactively is within tlle discretion of the State Court. Ree
e.q. Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunburst Oil amd Refining
Co., 287 U.S. 358. As stated by 1\fr.•Justice Cordoza,
"The choice (retroacfrye or prospective only) for any
state may
. be determined hv. the juristic philosophy of
tlw judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its
orig-in and nature." Id at 365.
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The two legal encyclopedias Am. Jur. and Corpiis
Juris agree that the majority of state courts have held
that decisions will be applied retroactively. See 20 Am.
Jitr. 562, Courts Section 233; 21 CJS 326 Coitrts Sec.
194. However, Ani. Jur. points out an execption that
applies in cases such as the instant casP.
"The overruling of a judicial construction of
a statute '.vill not be given retroactive effect. Such
a decision ''till be limited to the effect ordinarily
inherent in a change of a statutory rule, that is,
merely prospective 0ffect."

:20 Am. Jur. 2d 562-563 Courts Section 234. -While this
exception may be sufficient support for a decision m
appellant's favor, appellant will go further.
Tracing the history of the question of retrospective
vs. prospective, shows that the early view was that all
decisions had to have retroactive effect; there was no
authority for the proposition that judicial de-cisions made
law only for the future. Blackstone and Commentaries
(i9 (15th ed. 1809) Norton i:s. Shell)'y County 118 U.S .
.J-25 (1886). The philosophy of most all the cases requiring retroactive application is that tlw court interprets
rather than creates the law; that an overruled decision
should have no effect and should h<' treated as if it never
was. See Grny, Nature and Sourc<'s of Law, 222 (1st ed.
1909). The law was treated as if it were "a brooding
omnipresence" and the court
applies the law to
tho facts.
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Legal philosophers and courts
recently realiz(•<l
that such a v1ew was not very realistic and sometimes
led to unjust results. Austin maintained that judges do,
in fact do something more than discover hrw; they make
it, in many instances. He advoeai('d that rather than
be erased by a later decision, an ovenuled decision is to
be considered a juridicial fact and cases dPciclecl nndPr
it and relations entered into in reliance on it are not to
be disturbed. ·Many other legal philosophers and jurists
have espoused the same vie\\'. See, e.q. Cordoza, . Address 55 Rep. N.r. State Bar Ass'11, 2G3 29G-297 (1952);
37G, at 387-388; Trny11or, Bad Lands in a Apprllate
.T11dge's Rralni of Reason, rtah L. Rt>v. 157, 167-168,
(1960) Bodeheimrr, Jurisprudence (19G2). Professor Edger Bodeheimer,
of the University of rtah,
College of Law faculty writes, "an unfortunatP consPquence of discarding a prPcedent under the still-pr<>vailing doctrine is the retroactive f'ffrct of an overruling
<1eeision. . . . R<>gardlC'ss of the theoretical question as
to whether a judicial decision is law until such time as
it is chang·f•d, or nwrely rehnttahle evidene<' of the law,
it would seem perfectly sound practice for a court to
overturn a precedent. hut refns0 to apply, on grounds
of e11uitahle estopp<>l, thf> nPW principle (rdroactively)"
I rl n t :17 5-37 G.

The Austinian view started g-ain111g- arceptanct> in
courts as early as one lrnndrecl years ago. In Ohio,
wf·r« lH·ld ilh·µ;al and void,
althon.d1 lPgislatin·
tho:-;p alrPa<ly grantt•d W<'l'P irnrnnnizt•d l)y a prospertiv<>
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application of the rnle of the
Bingham vs. Miller,
17 Ohio 445 (1848). The United States Supreme Court
first drew on the Austinian concept in Gepcke vs. Dulmque, 1 Wall 175 (1863). They disearded the old concept of required retroactivit.Y. The new theory was regarded favorably by Mr. Justic(• Holmes in Kithn vs.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). Then in
1932, Mr. Justice Cordoza speaking favorably of the
Austinian approach denied a federal due process attack
on a state court decision allowing prospective application
only. Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunbitrst Oil and Refini·11g Co., 287 U.S. 358. Eight years later, Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes reasoned that because a law was detPrmined unconstitutional or a case overruled, it must
still be considered "an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration."
Chicot Coitnty Drainage Dist. vs. Baxter State Bank,
808 tT.S. :n1 (1940).
Finally, the Supreme Court has looked with favor
on having prospective application only. In Mossrr vs.
Darrow, 3-1-1 U.S. 2G7, at 276, cited approvingly in Linklrttcr vs. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 at 628, Mr. Justice Black
"There is rnnch to be said in fa\'Or of such a rule
( prospectivP application
for casPs arising in the
future."
ThP instant case might be decided in dt>fendant's
on thP exception, noted hy Am ..h1r., that retro-
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activity is denied in cases dealing with construction of
statutes. Howevt>r, the sanw result could be reached by
re-examining the entire contro\·ersy of retroactivity vs.
prospectivity. At this stage in tlw history of Jurisprudence, there can be no doubt that judges do make law;
the law is no longer regarded as a "brooding omnipresence." Inasmuch as the old theory lwhind the rule of
retroactivity is thoroughly disc·redikd, an Pxamination
of prospective vs. retroactive application, in light of
more modern and rt>alistic legal philosophy is need<>d.
If it is considered that a jndicial decision can make law,
then we mnst consider that the case of McConnell vs.
Commissiouer of Fi11a11CP, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394
was the law in Utah until tlw TVortheu case; and furtht•1-,
the the McConnell case gon•rns all these cases based on
facts taking place prior to thP TVorthe11 case. Tlrns, an
ovPrruling precedent wonld operate mnch tlw same as a
l<•gislative enactmf•nt. This seem:-; to lw tlw only rPalistie
and practical approaeh.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

Equitable Pstopp<'l should apply in this case m the
:'l:'nse that Profrssor Hod1·11ht•i111(•r disC'USSl'd it abovP. In
1·ssPnce, the• argtlllH·llt is that tlH· d1•frJ1dant lias justifiahl:-· n•li<·d on tlw
Stat<· Supreme Ccurt's dPcision
of JlcConnell 1:s. Commissioner of Fi11aJ1CI', 13 etah 2d
375 P.:?d
and
dmw rn to tliPir ddriuwnt. rl1 ll<'
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Stat(• I mmranc1· Fund has not taken into consideration
in fixing thPir premiums tJw fact that they are required to pa:· attorney's fees. As pointed out at the
]H•aring in the lowPr court, the premimns charged to
t•111plo:·prs hy appellant ar<' hased on the amount of
('Ompensation paid to injured employees in a particular
illdnstry. ] f rompen:-;ation paid ont was reimbursed in
\rholP to appellant as result of a third-party action, then
tlH•n' would lw no increase in prt>miurns. 'l1his was the
vractice prior to lVortlu?11 h<'ranse the State Insurance
F'nnd actuari<·s, in figuring rates for premiums, were
J'Plying on thP d1•cision in JlcC011ncll i·s. Comniissioner
1,f Fi1u111c1'. FnrtJwr. tlw Stat(' Insurance Fund is conto lw mad<· up of tru:;t monies, Utah State At!1n11e!J Ge11cral's opi11iou :Xo. G3-Ul5. Tlw failure to follow the law in administering trust monies may "·ell rrs ult in prosPeution against dl'fendant's Pmployees, lnd11st rial Co111missio11 i·s. Strong, 239 Pac. 12. If we view
the affret of thr Wort71r11 C'ase as oyerrnling JlcConndl,
;1ml dt·C"laring it as JWV<'r !wing law, then defendant's
r·mployP<>s failed to follow tlH· law hy refusing to pay
fr1•:-;. This
S<'<'lll to lw a rather hypotlil'tical and hyprrtt•clmical int<'rpretation; however, the
sort of situation happt>nPd in Jlossrr 1·s. Darrow,
341 U.S. 2G7 (1951). Tlw dPfrndant, Darrow was held
JH'rsonall:· liahlP for $4:3,000 as trustee of a reorganization trnst. Not onl:· WPI'<' th<' acts complained of not
eonsidf•r<>d wrongf'nl prior to the ease, but he did not
p(']'sonall:· profit from any of th<' acts \\·hich th<' ease
Jnw suh:-:PqlH'ntI:-· prohihifrd.
.•Jnstire Rlark dissented,
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stating "It seems to me, howeYer, that there is no reason
why the rnle should he retroactively applied ... Under
these circmnstances, if the new rule is to he announced
by the Court, I think it should he given prospertive applieation only.''
'rI1e deft>nse of equitahlt> Pstoppel used in the present
case is somewhat different than mmal. Generally, equitahle estop1wl is pn•dicatPd on defendant's relianc(• on
the conduct of the plaintiff. In this cas<', the only eoncluct of plaintiff's that dd<>ndant relied upon was payrnent "-ith acquiesenc<>, albeit protested acquiesenc<>, in
non participation in costs and attorney's fres. The real
n·liance, in this case hy hoth dt>ft>ndant and plaintiffs
was in the Ftah Snprenw Court dt>cision in tlw JlcC01111ell
1·asP. However, this is sufficient relianr<' for the def<·nsP
0t t•quitahle estoppel to 1m·\·<>nt rutroaetive appliration.
llod1·1tl1eimcr, .J11ri.<i]Jnuln1ce, ::374 (19G2).
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE

BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In its ans;\·ers to plaintiffs' <'Omplaints, the State
Tnsurance Fnnd
tlte d1•f(·nsP of statntt• of limitations. The lowPr court, in its i11<·111ornndurn dPcision, lwld
that the limitation p<'riod of R<>c. 78-12-25 U t11l1 Corle A1111.
(
applied to t]1(' instant cast'. That H•dion providPs
a four y<>ar limitation p<•rio<l for adions upon eontrad:-;,
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obligations, not foun<led upon a writing, and for services
rendered. rrhe lower court further held that the limitation period began to run from the date plaintiffs reimlrnrsed the State Insurance Fund. Inasmuch as all the
<'ases consolidated in this action were begun four years
from the date appellant -..ms reimbursed, the lower court
held that none of plaintiff's claims were barred by the
statntP of limitations.
Appellant takes issue with the lower court's decision
on this point. Appellant's liability in these cases, if any,
is not based on a contract eitlwr expressed or implied.
Liability is impost-d hy Sec. 35-1-62 Utah Code Ann.
(Rq>l. Yol. 19G3), and the Ftah Supreme Court's de('ision in 1Vortl1en rs. Shurt.liff and Andrews, Inc., 19
l' tali 2d 80, 42G P.2d 223, intPrpreting- that statute. If
appellant is liahlt> to vlaintiffs lwcaust> of Sec. 35-1-62,
tlwn tJip limitation JWriod should he that provided in
1·ithPr SPc. 78-12-26 (4) or Sec. 35-1-99 Utah Code Ann.
SPction 78-12-2G ( 4) ]H'O\'ides a thrt-e year limitation
pt>riod for actions for liability hasPd on a state statute.
"\notlwr limitation pf'riod, that provided in Sec. 351-99 Utah Code A1111. may be applicabk That section
Jll'o\·idPs a thr<'P yt>ar limitation for actions for compensation undPr \Yorkmen's Compensation· 1aws. This limitation rwriod sePms applicable inasmuch as the statute
en·ating- th<' liability, S<'c. 35-1-G2(1) Utah Code Ann.,
is a \Y orlrnwn's Co11qwnsation statntr.
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It might be argued that claims, such as in the instant
case, are not claims for compensation, hut rather claims
for attorneys foes, and, thus, the limitation period for
work:nwn's injuries should not appl.'·· I lo\n'v('r, such
argument fails to carry weight when it is considcrt>d
that the fund or pool of morn'.'· from which the attorn<'.'·'s
fees are paid is in reality tlH' amount paid for compensation of injuriPs. The attorrn'y's frps i11 all thP presPnt
cases are based on a 1wrct>ntage of tlw recovery for injuries and actually are d<>rived from tl1e rn01wys paid for
the injuries. Thus, the claims in tlH' instant case are not
for attorrn,y's ft'es, lrnt for that portion of ("Olll)H'nsation
paid to the Stah' Insurance Fund which r<'}Jl'esPnts what
the State Insurance Fund would have liad to pay an
attorney to colled. A hypotlH·tical 0xample may hdp to
illustrate the point. Assmiw, an injm('d worker receivPs
a $30,000.00 award in a third-party claim. If th0 State
Insurance Fund had paid out $10,000.00 in eomprnsation
paynwnts, the workPr, hdor<' tlw TVort71e11 cas<>, would
only p;Pt $10,000.00 of the award. 1'hP InsnrancP fnnd
would get $10,000.00 and tlH' attorrn'.'· wot1ld get $10,000.00. Aft<>r Worthen, the Statr Insuranc<' Fund is n'quirrd to hear its portion of attonw.'·'s eosts, so now th<'
InsuraneP Fund only r0cPiv<>s $G,GGG.OO whilr thP
injured worker is allovYed to rPtain an additional
or $13,334.00. rrlrns, th<· claims in tlw instant case
nr<' not really for attonwy's fr<>s hnt for that portion of
thr compensation award paid to tlH' RtatP lnsnrancP Ft1rnl
\\·hich is compnt<>d on the hasis of its sharr of attorne.'·'s
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frPs. If the claim is considered as a claim for additional
C'Ompensation, then the limitation period pertaining to
actions for compensation should apply.
If tlw Utah Supreme Court decides that Sec. 35-1-99
Ctah Code Ann. is the pro1wr statute of Limitations then
tlw limitation ]Wriod should run from the date of the last
payment to tlw worker h.Y the State Insurance Fund. If
SPc. 78-12-2G( 4) Utah Code Ann. is considered applicable,
then the limitation period should begin, as held in the
lower court, from the date that payment was withheld
by the State Insurance Fund.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS SHOULD BE DENIED FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

The law is too well s0ttled to require citation that
a claimant mnst exhaust administrative remedies before
bringing his claim to court. If thP Court views the claims
in these cases as claims for additional compensation, as
pointed ont in the section of this hrief immediately above,
t11P plaintiffs must first exhaust administrati,·e remedies
L>· bringing their claim befort> the State Industrial Commission. SPc. 33-1-(i() Utah Code Ann.
Onl.'· uf1er having their claim denied by the Com-

mav thev bring their claims to Court.
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POINT V
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST;

AND

THUS,

THEIR

COMPLAINTS

SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

If the Court does not view plaintiffs claims as claims
for additional compensation, but rather as claims for
attorney's fees, then appellant would argue that plaintiffs
are not real party in intPrest. The question presented is
whether the plaintiffs or their attornt-ys on tht> third11arty lawsuits are propt-r parties.

The defendant, in its answer, has raised the affinnative defense that the plaintiffs are not the real party in
interest. The law is clear that a plaintiff must possess
a right and be owed a duty before he may invoke the
jurisdiction of the court. Wilson vs. Kiesel, 9 Utah 397,
i35 Pac. 488; 39 Am . .Jur. 858 Partifs Section 9. This is
particularly true with respect to statutory actions, as is
the pn•sent casP. See Hunt vs. State, 201 N.C. 37, 158
S.E. 703 wherein the court held, "'\Vhere a cause of action
is given hy Statute, only tl10se 1wrsons who are grantc>d
the cause of action may sue."
Assuming the Statute, SPc. 35-1-62 l./tah Code .An11.
(Repl. vol. 1966) clearly impos<:'s a duty on def Pndant to
pay attorrn"'y's fpes, it is not clPar to whom this duty is
ow<:'d. Defendant is obviously concerned with this point
to prevPnt a donblP liability sitnation. In a case similar
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to the instant case, filed in Federal District Court for
Utah, tlw ''third party" plaintiffs' attorneys brought the
action. See DPlbcrt 111. Draper, Jr. et. al. vs. Travelers
I11sura11ce Co., et. al., CiYil No. C-228-67.
11 lw fact that as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint
plaintiffs have already paid their attorneys' fees, has no
hearing. Tlw rPal party in interest is determined as of
thP date the cause of action arose, c.f., Wilson vs. Kiesel,
0 Utah 397, 35 Pac. 488; TVhitc vs. Tulsa Iron & Jletal
Corp., 185 Okla. GOG, 95P. 2cl 590; not from the fact that
:-:uhseqnently, plaintiffs paid their attorneys, a payment
they may not han• been required to make. The duty
imposed (in these cases hy statntt>) must be owed to the
plaintiff, or tlwre can he no recovery. Huntington t:s .
utl. Sat:. Ba11k, 9() U.S. 388; Illinois C.R. Co. vs. Baker,
Fi5 K :-·. :J1 1:=i9 8. \r. 11G9.
•\

1

The :;;tatute reads " ... attorm•y's foes shall be paid
and charg-ed
against the parties ... "The
statute plaers the bmden on both parties. The implication
hnd most obvious construction of the statnte is that the
may collect his fees from both parties, proportionately. Tf snch is the case, plaintiff's claims should
]ip dPniPd as
arP not tlw real
in interPst.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DEFENSE OF LA CHES.
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Although it may be determined that plaintiffs' claims
are not barred by the Statute of Limitations, recovery
may still be precluded on grounds of laches. HolmlJerg
,,·s. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392; Alsov n;. Riker, 155 U.S.
448; Godden vs. Kimmel, 99 F.S. 201; Tl'hitney i-s. Fox,
166 U.S. 637. The doctrine of laches may, "when justice
demands it, refuse relief, t>ven if the time which has
Plapsed . . . is less than prescrilwd
the
of
l .. imitations." 27 Am. Jur. 2d 094 Rquity Section 157.
Laches, frequently krmed the "doctrine of stale demand" is an equitable defense based on the public policy
considerations of preventing unreasonable, knowing, injurious delay. Mocka.ll rs. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556; Halstead vs. Grinnan, 152 r.S. 412. The defrnse of laches is
i10t mandatory, but is to be applied in the sound discretion of the court. Davidson rs. Grady, 105 f. 2d 405.
Sinclair vs. AllPnder, 238 Iowa 212, 2() N.\V. 2d 320.
There are three requirements beforp tlw doctrine of
}aches may be applied to preclude reCO\'Pry. rrhey are:
Lapse of time.
The plaintiff had knowledge of the facts g1vmg
him a canst' of action and arnplL• opportunity
to presPnt his claims.
The adverse party had good iTason to believe that
plaintiff's rights were worthless and had
been abandonPd so that it would hP an in-
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justice to permit the plaintiff to now assert
them.
See 27 Arn .•htr. 2d 701-702, Eq1tity Section 162.
There is no question that there was a delay or lapse
of time ·with respect to all plaintiffs' claims. Although
with respect to some of the claims, the delaY is not
nearly so long as with others, it does appear that all
the cases were delayed. The length of time elapsed is
not eSSl'ntial to the defense of laches, although there has
to appear to be some delay. Archaubmtlt vs. Sprouse, 213
S. C. 336, 55 8. E. 2d 70. "Lapse of time is an element
hut not the controlling factor of laches." Finucane i·s.
Jfoydau, 8() Idaho 199, 3S4 P. 2d 236.
On the other hand, the main e!Pnwnt of the defense
of laches is that tlw plaintiff had knowledge of the facts
giving rise to his eansP of action and still delayed.
Greeley vs. Lo1)eland lrrig. Co. i:s. JI cClouglzland, 140
Colo. 173, 342 P. 2d 104;); Jlo11ta11a Power Co. rs. Park
Electric Corp., 1-±0 Mont. 293, 371 P. 2d 1; Morris vs.
Ross, ;)S K.M. 379, 271 P. 2d
Eqnity courts decline
tt) assi.'-t a 1wrson who has "slept upon his rights" and
shows no exc11sP for his laches in assPrting them. Lane
& B Co. 'i'S. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, Speidel t'S. Henrici, 120
LS. 377. In the present case there is no doubt plaintiffs
had knowl('dgc> of the facts giving rise to other causes of
action. 'rhey all dNnandt>d the defendant participate in
tlH' att('l'lH',\'S f(•('s ::tml costs; they all said under protest,
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and then they all slept on their rights until years later,
after someone else had paved the way for them by appealing the Worthen case. There can be no excuse for such a
delay.
The final element of laches is that the defendant
has good reason to believe that the plaintiff's rights are
worthless, or have been abandoned. Factual support for
the existence of this element appears from paragraph
eleven of the complaints in cases with District Court
numbers 186365, 183213 and 182724. In said paragraph
plaintiffs allege a long series of continued protest against
the defendant not paying a portion of costs and attorneys
fees. As support, plaintiffs offered as exhibits several
documents dated mostly in 19G4 and 1965. Defendant
feels that such a showing without filing action for four
to five years certainly indicates justifiable reliance that
the plaintiffs' rights were worthless or had been abandoned. For support that it appeared plaintiff's rights
were worthless, defendant offers the case of M cConnfll
vs. Commission of Fi·nance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394
which was the law in Utah at the time the transactions
took place.
Some courts have added a further requirement to
the defense of laches. "l1hey require a showing of detriment to defendant to allow the state claim. Defendant
has discussed the detriment in the section of this brief
dealing with Equitable Estoppel.
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POINT VII
APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY A PORTION OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES.

As a final argument, appellant urges the Utah Supreme Court to reconsider the holding in its opinion in
the Worthen case. Worthen vs. Shurtleff, supra was decided by a closely divided court only a few years after
llf cC01onell vs. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395,
375 P. 2d 394. Appellant hopes that in light of the cost
and problems raised by Worthen, the Court may wish to
reaffirm the strong rationale of the McConnell case. In
support of this argument, appellant reprints below the
State Insurance Fnnds argument in the Worthen vs.
Shitrtleff brief.
The issue presented in this case is the construction
of Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provides, in part, as follows:
"If any recovery is obtained against such thi'rd person it shall be disbursed as follows:

(1) The reasonable expense of the action, includ-

ing attorney's fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their
intf>rests may appear.

(2) The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
made.
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(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured em-

ployee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisf\ in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person
liable for compensation." (1£mphasis added)

This statute was construed, conc<>rning the identical
facts in this case, in McConnell vs. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P2d 39-±. 'l1his Court held that
the State Insurance Fund is entitled to full reimbursernt•nt for all compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff.
The lJ.Uestion in that case, as in this case, is whether or
not, nnder tltP circmnstances, the State Insurance Fund's
shart> of tlH• recovery
he reduced by a proportionate share of the attorm•y's feps incurred in the action
hrought by tlw injured Pmployet•. In this case and in tlw
Ji cCo n11ell cast\ the plaintiff, while in the course and
sco1H' of his employment, suffered personal injuries b:·
a third party tort feasor. 1-'he Stat<' Insurance Fund, as
compensation carriN for the plaintiff's 1o•mployer, paid
nwdical and other com1wnsation henPfits to tlw plaintiff.
Thereafter the:- employee, through his attorney, brongl1t
an action against the third party tort f easor. The attorn('.\·s in both cas0s proseented the matter on a contingPncy basis of one-fourth of the rPCovery. Subsequent
to settlement plaintiff's counsel sPek<>d to rpcover hack
from the State Insurance Fund one-fourth of the amount
paid to the plaintiff's 0mplo:·ee as attorrn'!''s fees.
35-1-62, set out above, contemplates a three ordt'r of
priority of dishurst>nwnt, that is: (1) Expenses of the ac-
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tion, including attorney's fees shall be paid against the
parties as their interPst may appear; (2) Of any sums
remaining, the insurance carrier shall be reimbursed
for compensation benefits in full; (3) The balance if any,
should he paid to the injured employee or his heirs.
rrhis Court has held that ·when the State Insurance
Fnnd was not a party to the original action then it was
not liable nor had it incurred any legal expenses. Sub
section 2 of the statute requires that the insurance carrier be reimbursed in full. Therefore, the only reasonconstruction that can he made is that if the Stah·
Insurancr Fnnd was not a 1>arty to the action it must
hr reimbursed in full.

It is agreed that the State Insurance Fund did not
t'mploy Edward M. Garrett and in light of this Court's
rJast ruling was not required to in order to protect its
interests in receiving full reimbursement. There is also
no donbt that the State Insurance :F\md was not a
to the original action and the ref ore attorney's fees cannot he assessed against it under sub-section (1) of 351-62.
Through the differing statutes of sister states dealing with Workmen's Compensation Laws is of different
wording and interpretation, it is interesting to note that
in the problem of distribution of the proceeds of a third
party action that Utah follows the majority rule. 2 Larson Workman's Compensation Law (1961), Sec. 74.32:
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"Usually attorney's fees and expenses are deducted both in priority to the employer's lien on
the employee's rt>covery, and before there is any
excess for the employee in the employer's recovery. If the snm recovered hy the employee is
more than enough to pay attorney's fees and reimburse the carrier, the carrier is reimbursed in
full, and is not required to share the legal expenses involved in obtaining the recovery. In other
words, under the usual provision, the legal expenses diminish the over-all sum to which the insurer's claim attaches; but if it is possible to do
so within that fund as diminshed the insurer 1s
Pntitled to be reimbursed in full * * * "
See also Tucker vs. Nason (Iowa), 87 N.vV. 2d 547;
Firemen's Fimd Indemnity Co. 1/8. Batts, (N. J.) 78 A.
2d 293.
It is therefore, the appe11ant's position that the
l . ower Court's ruling allowing attorney's fees to Edward

M. Garrett was erroneous in light of the McConnell decision and in light of the reasonable interpretation of the
statute. It is clear that the State Insurance Fund was not
a party of this action and the reimbursement in full for
all payments made by the State Insurance Fund.
It is, therefore, submitted that Sec. 35-1-62 as applied

to the facts of this case compels a reversal to the order
entered and judgment should be entered in favor of the
Director of Finance as a matter of law.
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CONCLUSION"
The decision in Worthen vs. Sh1trtleff, supra should
not be applied retroactiYely either on grounds of equitable estoppel or because the Court is of the philosophy,
it should
be giYPn prospective application. If the
Court decides that a three-year statute of limitations is
applicable then the claims of James Allen Scott, Don
Gerald Williams, Angelo Melo, \Vaulstine McNeely and
\Villiam J. Roedel should be denied. All claims may be
barred by the defense of laches. If the claim in this case
is, in reality, a claim for compensation, then it should be
denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. If
tlw claim is for fees owing to attorneys, the plaintiffs
are not the real party in interest and their claims should
lw dPnied. Finally, the Court may overrule the W orthPn
case reaffirm McConndl and deny plaintiffs' claims.
Respectfully submitted,
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